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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court, by receiving letters from various

individuals prior to sentencing as to matters to be considered in the
course of sentencing Defendant, erred by not disclosing the nature
and content of such letters to Defendant and thereby denied Defendant
of his rights to due process and the effective assistance of counsel.

5

The appellate court reviews issues concerning constitutional rights
for correction of error.
(Utah 1991); State v.
also

State

denied,

v.

Palmer,

State

Thurman,

v.

Humphrey,

823 P.2d 464, 465-66

846 P.2d 1256, 1266 (Utah 1993);

see

803 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1990), cert.

815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991); Cf.

State

v.

Pena,

869 P.2d 932,

940-41

(Utah 1994)

Miranda

rights is a question of law reviewed for correct of error);

State

v.

Richardson,

(whether a defendant validly waived his or her

843 P. 2d 517, 518

(Utah App. 1992)

(trial

court's interpretation of binding case law presents question of law
that is reviewed for correctness); State

v.

Mabe,

864 P.2d 890, 892

(Utah 1993) (ultimate legal determination of whether a confession is
voluntary is conclusion of law, which is reviewed for correctness).
This issue was not raised before the trial court.

For the reasons

stated below, this issue presents exceptional circumstances and/or
circumstances constituting plain error.

See State

v. Archambeau,

P.2d 920, 922-23 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Gibbons,
1311 (Utah 1987), on subsequent
2.
the

appeal,

820

740 P.2d 1309,

779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989).

Whether the trial court erred by improperly interpreting

firearm

enhancement

statute

or

abused

its

discretion

by

sentencing Defendant to a determinate term of five years pursuant to
the firearms enhancement statute set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3203.

An appellate court will set aside a sentence imposed by a trial

6

court if the sentence represents an abuse of discretion, the trial
court

failed

to consider

all relevant

factors, or the

imposed exceeded the limits prescribed by law.
P.2d 851, 861 (Utah 1992) (citing State
1135

(Utah 1989).

v.

State

sentence

v. Brown,

Gibbons,

853

779 P.2d 1133,

However, the trial court's interpretation and

application of a statute to a defendant's sentence is reviewed by the
appellate court for correction of error.
1355,

1357

1992).

(Utah 1993); State

v.

State

Vigil,

v.

Larsen,

842 P.2d

865 P.2d

843, 844

This issue was not raised before the trial court.

(Utah
The

circumstances of this issue present exceptional circumstances and/or
circumstances constituting plain error.

See State

P.2d 920, 922-23 (Utah App. 1991); State v.
1311 (Utah 1987), on subsequent
3.

Whether

trial

appeal,

counsel,

by

v. Archambeau,

Gibbons,

820

740 P.2d 1309,

779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989).
failing

to

object

to

the

imposition by the trial court of a determinate five year firearm
enhancement

term pursuant

to Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-3-203, denied

Defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel.

To make such a showing, Defendant must show, first, that

counsel rendered a deficient performance, falling below an objective
standard

of

reasonable

professional

counsel's performance was prejudicial.
(Utah 1988).

judgment, and,
Bundy

v. DeLand,

second,

that

763 P. 2d 803

Such claims present mixed questions of law and fact.

7

Strickland
(1984).

v.

Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2070

The appellate court defers to the trial court's findings of

fact, but reviews its application of legal principles to its factual
findings for correctness.

State

v. Hay,

859 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Utah 1993) .

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution
Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and
regulations, whose

interpretation

is determinative,

are

set out

verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and arguments of
the instant brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By information filed March 30, 1994, Defendant, Joseph DiLello,
was

initially

charged

with

Murder,

a

First

Degree

Felony,

in

violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203. The information, pursuant to
plea negotiation, was later amended so as to charge Defendant with
Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code

8

Ann. §§ 76-5-103 and 76-3-203, alleging the use of a firearm in the
course

of

the

alleged

Aggravated

Assault.

On

Defendant pleaded guilty to Aggravated Assault.

June

27, 1995,

That same day,

Defendant executed a Statement of Defendant in Advance of Plea of
Guilty.

The matter was then set for sentencing with Adult Probation

and Parole directed to provide the trial court with a presentence
investigation report.
On August 8, 1995, Defendant and appointed counsel, Glen T.
Cella, appeared for sentencing.

The court sentenced Defendant to

imprisonment at the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of 05 years and ordered a firearm enhancement of five years to run
consecutively.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

At approximately 4:00 a.m. on November 7, 1993, Defendant's

brother Michael DiLello arrived at Defendant's home and immediately
started

pounding

on

the

door

(R.

345,

Preliminary

Hearing

Transcript);
2.

Defendant and Defendant's wife, and others staying with

Defendant and his wife, feared for their safety due to Michael's
well-known

violent

tendencies

(R.

Transcript; R. 37, % 2, Information);

9

336-37,

Preliminary

Hearing

3.

Through the door of Defendant's home, Michael was told not

to come in and to go home (R. 33 9, Preliminary Hearing Transcript);
4.

Michael kicked in the door and rushed towards Defendant (R.

342, Preliminary Hearing Transcript), at which time Defendant, who
feared for his life, shot and killed Michael
5.

(Id.);

Defendant was initially charged with Murder, a First Degree

Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 by information
filed March 30, 1994 (R. 36, Information);
6.

The information, pursuant to plea negotiation (see R. 149,

Statement of Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty, H 3 ) , was later
amended so as to charge Defendant with Aggravated Assault, a Third
Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-103 and 76-3203 (R. 155 Amended Information);
7.
guilty

At the Pretrial Hearing on June 27, 1995, Defendant pleaded
to Aggravated Assault

(R. 157, Minute Entry; R.

233-61,

Pretrial Hearing Transcript; R. 14 9, fH 3-5, Statement of Defendant
in Advance of Plea of Guilty), after which the trial court set the
matter for sentencing on August 8, 1995;
8.

On August 8, 1995, Defendant and his appointed counsel,

Glen T. Cella, appeared for sentencing (R. 158, Minute Entry).
the beginning of the Hearing, the trial court stated:
I received a Presentence Report.
I've also
received a number of other letters both from
10

At

parties that we've -- they were letters we
previously received at the prior hearings.
Also, I've received a letter from Valene Roundy,
and also I think a letter from your mother that
I have received. Now, Mr. Cella, have you had a
chance to review the presentence report?
(R. 178, lines 5-10, Sentencing Hearing Transcript);
10.

The trial court sentenced Defendant to imprisonment at the

Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of 0-5 years and ordered
a firearm enhancement of five years to run consecutively (R. 193,
Sentencing Hearing Transcript);
11.

The trial court signed the Judgment and Commitment to the

Utah State Prison on August 8, 1995, which was entered on August 10,
1995 (R. 159, Judgment and Commitment to the Utah State Prison);
12.

Thereafter, the trial court's Sentence was entered on

August 17, 1995 (R. 160-61, Sentence);
13.

Defendant filed Notice of Appeal on September 5, 1995 (R.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The

trial

court

failed

to

disclose

the

contents

or

substance of the letters received after Defendant's guilty plea and
prior to sentencing.

As a result, the trial court denied Defendant

of his rights to due process and the effective assistance of counsel.
By failing to disclose the contents or substance of the letters, the
trial court failed to provide Defendant with his due process rights
11

of notice and the opportunity to examine the contents or the letters
to determine

their reliability and to effectively

inaccurate information.

challenge any

In so doing, the trial court failed to

insure that the decision-making process and the ultimate sentence was
predicated

upon

information.

accurate

and

reasonably

reliable

and

relevant

Further, the trial court made no effort to determine

the reliability of the statements and allegations set forth the
undisclosed

letters.

In the instant case, had the trial court

disclosed the content or substance of the letters to Defendant's
counsel or Defendant, there is a possibility that explanation or
argument by Defendant's counsel or Defendant would have caused the
trial court to reach a different conclusion as to the recommendation
from

Adult

Probation

and

Parole.

Reversal

and

remand

for

resentencing is appropriate in the instant case even if the trial
court were to contend that it was unaffected by the assertions set
forth in the undisclosed letters.

Finally, public policy concerns

mandate full disclosure of letters such as those in the instant case
inasmuch as (1) the sentencing philosophy in the area of criminal law
provide that the punishment should not only fit the crime but the
defendant

as

well,

(2)

it

is

essential

that

fairness

in

the

sentencing of defendants in the criminal system both be perceived as
such by the public and the defendant and, in fact, be fair, and

12

(3) the information about the defendant must be accurate if society
and the individual are to be properly served.
2.

In

enhancement

the

course

of

imposing

the

determinate

for a full five years, the trial court exceeded the

limits prescribed by law and thereby abused its discretion.
doing,

the

firearm

trial

court

fixed

a definite

term

of

By so

imprisonment,

exceeding its authority set forth in the enhancement and sentencing
statutes.
3.

Defendant's appointed trial counsel, by failing to object

to the imposition by the trial court of a determinate term of five
years pursuant to the firearm enhancement statute, denied Defendant
of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.

ARGUMENTS
1.

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS TO NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD AND
THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY NOT
DISCLOSING THE NATURE AND CONTENTS OF THE CONFIDENTIAL
LETTERS RECEIVED FROM VARIOUS INDIVIDUALS PRIOR TO
SENTENCING,

The right to due process, as guaranteed by both the United
States1 and Utah Constitutions,2 requires that criminal proceedings
x

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states,
in relevant part, that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law
."
In addition,
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution states, in relevant part, that no state shall "deprive
13

be conducted to insure that the decision-making process is predicated
upon accurate and reasonably reliable and relevant information.
State

v.

Johnson,

856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993); State

707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985); State
(Utah 1982); State v.

Lipsky,

v.

Howell,

v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007

608 P.2d 1241, 1248

(Utah 1980).

Inasmuch as sentencing is a critical part of a criminal proceeding,
see State

v. Bell,

754 P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1988); Casarez,

656 P.2d at

1007, "a defendant is entitled to due process protections during
sentencing to prevent procedural unfairness."
58; Casarez,

656 P. 2d at 1007; see

also

Presnell

See Bell,
v.

754 P.2d at

Georgia,

439 U.S.

14, 16, 99 S.Ct. 235, 236 (1978) (holding that procedural fairness is
as obligatory at the sentencing phase of a trial as at the guilt
phase).
In Gardner

v. Florida,

430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197 (1977), the

United States Supreme Court stated that uit is now clear that the
sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy the
requirements of the Due Process clause . . . ." Id.

at 358, 97 S.Ct.

at 1204 (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254 (1967) and
Specht

v.

Patterson,

386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209 (1967)).

Such

any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
//
2

Article I, Section 7, of the Utah Constitution states, "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.
14

requirements include the opportunity to be heard and confronted by
the witnesses against a defendant, and that a defendant be afforded
an opportunity to present evidence in his or her own behalf.
Lipsky,

See

608 P.2d at 1247.
Although a defendant "has no substantive right to a particular

sentence within the range authorized by statute, the sentencing is a
critical stage of the criminal proceeding at which he is entitled to
the effective assistance of counsel. "3
05; Townsend

v.

Burke,

Id.

at 358, 97 S.Ct. at 1204-

334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252

(1948).

"The

defendant has a legitimate interest in the character of the procedure
which leads to the imposition of sentence even if he may have no
right to object to a particular result of the sentencing process.
Id.

(citing Witherspoon

1770, 1776-78

(1968)).

v.

Illinois,

391 U.S. 510, 521-23, 88 S.Ct.

"If a sentencing judge is allowed to rely

upon information unknown to the defendant, the ability of counsel to
effectively

challenge

inaccurate

information

may

be

seriously

impaired, thereby threatening the defendant's right to effective

3

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
. . . have the Assistance of counsel for his defence." Article I, §
12 of the Utah Constitution provides: "In criminal prosecutions the
accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel . . . ."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1) (a) provides: "In
criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: To appear in person
and defend in person or by counsel."
15

assistance of counsel."
1994) (citing Casarez,

State

v.

Gomez,

887 P. 2d 853, 855

(Utah

656 P.2d at 1007).

The fundamental principles of procedural fairness in sentencing
mandate

the

right

of

a defendant

to examine

and

challenge

the

accuracy and reliability of the factual information upon which the
sentence is based.

Gomez,

P.2d at 148; State

v.

Anderson,

887 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1994); Lipsky,

Hanson,

632 P. 2d 877, 878

627 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1981); State
(Utah 1981) .

608
v.

As a result, factual

information upon which a sentence is based must be disclosed to a
defendant, except

in the rare case where the disclosure of the

information would jeopardize the life or safety of third parties.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(5) (Supp. 1994); Casarez,
accord

Gomez,

887 P.2d at 855.

656 P.2d at 1008;

In this regard, Utah Code Ann. § 77-

18-1(7) provides that " [a]t the time of sentence, the court shall
receive any testimony, evidence, or information the defendant or the
prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate

This

sentence.
presented
defendant."

in

testimony,

open court

evidence,

on record

or

and in

information
the presence

shall

be

of

the

(Emphasis Added).

The issue of the trial court's failure to disclose the letters
is raised for the first time on appeal.

Ordinarily, the failure to

raise an issue before the trial court precludes consideration of the

16

issue on appeal.
1994) .

There

State
are,

v.

Jennings,

however,

two

exceptions to this general rule.
922 (Utah App. 1991).

875 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah App.
limited

State

but

well-established

v. Archambeau,

820 P. 2d 920,

The appellate court may address an issue for

the first time on appeal if the trial court committed plain error or
there are exceptional circumstances.
In State
814,

110

v. Eldredge,

S.Ct.

62

Id.

773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied,

(1989),

the Utah

Supreme

Court

493 U.S.

outlined

the

following principles involved in determining whether "plain error"
exists:
The first requirement for a finding of plain
error is that the error be "plain," i.e., from
our examination of the record, we must be able
to say that it should have been obvious to a
trial court that it was committing error . . . .
The second and somewhat interrelated requirement
for a finding of plain error is that the error
affect the substantial rights of the accused,
i.e., that the error be harmful.
Id.

at 35; see

State

According to State

1993) .
1989),

also

u

v.

Dunn,

v.

Verde,

850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09

(Utah

770 P. 2d 116, 121-22

(Utah

in most circumstances, the term 'manifest injustice' [found

in Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)] is synonymous with the
standard expressly provided
elaborated upon in Eldredge

'plain error'

in Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d) and
. . . ."

17

The

second

exception

is

the

catch-all

"exceptional" or unusual" circumstances.
923.

device

Archambeau,

requiring

820 P. 2d at

This exception acts as a safety device "to make certain that

manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an
issue on appeal."

Id.

As to the plain error exception in the instant case, the trial
court committed plain error by failing to disclose the contents or
substance of the letters received by various individuals prior to
sentencing, which contained various unsubstantiated allegations about
Defendant.

Because such a failure is a violation of due process and

the effective assistance of counsel, it should have been obvious to
the trial court that it was committing error.
855;

Casarez,

656

P.2d

at

1007; Lipsky,

See Gomez,
608

P.2d

887 P. 2d at
at

1246-48.

Secondly, the failure of the trial court to comply with the standards
of due process and effective assistance of counsel affected the
substantial rights of Defendant by failing to insure that Defendant
was provided with requirements of due process and received effective
assistance of counsel prior to sentencing.
In addition to the "plain error" exception, the instant case
presents exceptional or unusual circumstances.

Defendant, for all

intents and purposes, was not provided with due process and the
effective assistance of counsel prior to the trial court imposing
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sentence.

Furthermore, Defendant's appointed trial counsel, by the

trial court's failure, was unable to request disclosure of the
contents or substance of the undisclosed letters.

Defendant, was

extremely unfamiliar with the constitutional and procedural due
process requirements with which the trial court was required to
comply prior to imposing

sentence.

momentous constitutional concern.

Requirements

that

are of

To not consider and correct this

matter on appeal would result in a great and manifest injustice or
harm by failing to protect the constitutional rights affected, as a
result of the trial court's

failures.

In the instant case, Defendant, with appointed counsel, appeared
for sentencing on August 8, 1995. At the beginning of the sentencing
hearing, the trial court stated:
I received a Presentence Report.

I've

also

received
a number of other letters
both from
parties
that we've -- they were letters
we
previously
received
at the prior
hearings.
Also, I've received a letter from Valene Roundy,
and also I think a letter
from your mother that
I have received.
Now, Mr. Cella, have you had a
chance to review the presentence report?
(R. 178, lines 5-10, Sentencing Hearing Transcript) (emphasis added).
As part of the record on appeal, included with the Presentence
Investigation Report and sealed, are additional letters4 apparently
4

Because the letters are included in the record on appeal with
the Presentence Investigation Report and, along with the Presentence
Investigation Report, are sealed, the letters are referred to in an
19

received by the trial court before Defendant's sentencing, which the
trial court
counsel.

failed to disclose to Defendant or Defendant's
One

of

the

letters,

dated

July

14,

1995,

trial

expresses

appreciation to the trial court for reviewing various items submitted
prior to the Pretrial Hearing on Defendant's negotiated plea.

Among

other things, the letter, without substantiation, alleges that
(1) Defendant had been violating the law since the subject shooting,
(2)

the subject

shooting

was not an isolated

incident,

escalation of a violent pattern of events, and
threatened
devices.
another

(3) Defendant had

other individual(s) with various dangerous weapons and

Apparently enclosed with the previously mentioned letter is
letter

unsubstantiated
about

but the

drug

from

an

individual,

which

contains

additional

allegations about Defendant, including

use, drug

dealing,

violent

threats

to

allegations

others, etc.

Finally, apparently enclosed with the aforementioned letter, dated
July 14, 1995, is a letter from an individual, claiming, among other
things,

that Defendant

is a skillful manipulator

various abusive acts towards other individuals.

that

engaged in

All, or at least

most, of the allegations contained in the aforementioned letters are

anonymous fashion because they arguably fall within the scope of
controlled
judicial
records.
See Utah
Code
of
Judicial
Administration, Rules 4-202.02(6), 4-202.03(6), and 4-203.
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based

on

double

hearsay

accounts

and

statements,

ambiguous

descriptions, and otherwise unsubstantiated assertions.
As evidenced by the record or the lack thereof, the trial court
did

not

state

aforementioned
otherwise.

on

the

record

the

contents

or

of

the

letters that he might have considered material or

Moreover, the trial court made no reference, whatsoever,

to receiving the previously mentioned letters.
court

substance

simply

mentioned,

in

passing,

the

Rather, the trial

letters

received

from

Defendant's mother and Valene Roundy, which are included with the
undisclosed letters as part of the record on appeal
lines 5-9, Sentencing Hearing Transcript).

(See

R. 178,

Trial counsel made no

request to examine or be apprised of the contents of the letters, due
apparently to the trial court's failure to disclose the receipt of
such letters.

Further, the trial court did not indicate in the

course of sentencing that there was any reason other than what should
arguably be the customary practice for not disclosing the entire
contents of the letters received by the trial court.
P.2d at 855; Casarezt

See

Gomez,887

656 P.2d at 1008.

By failing to disclose the contents of the letters received
prior to imposing sentence, the trial court violated Defendant's
fundamental rights to due process by precluding Defendant of notice
and the opportunity to rebut and present evidence in his own behalf
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as to the allegations made in the letters.
Lipsky,

608 P. 2d at 1247, 1248; Hanson,

P.2d at 878; see

also

Gomez,

887 P.2d at 855;

627 P. 2d at 55; Anderson,

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7).

632

In so doing, the

trial court failed to insure that the decision-making process and the
ultimate

sentence

was

predicated

reliable and relevant information.
Howell,
no

707 P.2d at 118.

effort

to

determine

upon

accurate

See Johnson,

and

reasonably

856 P.2d at 1071;

In the instant case, the trial court made
the

reliability

of

allegations set forth the undisclosed letters.

the

statements

and

While "due process

does not impose the full range of trial procedures designed to sift
truth from error in sentencing proceedings . . . this does not mean
. . . that there is no requirement that the evidence presented in
sentencing procedures be reliable."
(citing United
see

also

United

States
States

v.
v.

Miele,

Johnson,

856

P.2d

at

1071

989 F.2d 659, 663 (3rd Cir. 1993));

Weston,

448 F.2d 626, 634 (9th Cir. 1971)

(stating that " [a] rational penal system must have some concern for
the probable accuracy of the informational inputs in the sentencing
process) (citing Townsend

v.

Burke,

1252, 1255 (1948)); United

States

334 U.S. 736, 740-41, 68 S. Ct.

v. Baylin,

696 F.2d 1030, 1040 (3rd

Cir. 1981) (holding that "as a matter of due process, factual matters
may be considered as a basis for sentence only if they have some
minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation").
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In Gardner

v. Florida,

430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197 (1977), the

United States Supreme Court held that it is a denial of due process
to sentence a defendant on the basis of confidential information not
disclosed to a defendant or his counsel.

The Supreme Court, in the

process, noted that under such circumstances u[t]he risk that some of
the information accepted in confidence may be erroneous, or may be
misinterpreted . . . by the sentencing judge, is manifest."
359, 97 S.Ct. at 1205.

Id.

at

In addition, the Supreme Court recognized the

possibility that full disclosure by the trial court, followed by
explanation or argument by defense counsel, would have caused the
trial court to come to a different conclusion than that obtained
without such explanation or argument.
Like Gardner,

Id.

at 362; 97 S.Ct. at 1207.

the instant case involves information that was

held in confidence and never disclosed by the trial court prior to
imposing sentence.

Furthermore, in the instant case, like

Gardner,

had the trial court disclosed the content or substance of the letters
to Defendant's counsel or Defendant, there is a possibility that
possibility that explanation or argument by Defendant's counsel or
Defendant would have caused the trial court to reach a different
conclusion as to the recommendation from Adult Probation and Parole.
In State

v.

Lockwood,

399 So.2d 190 (La. 1981), a case cited
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with approval by the Utah Supreme Court in State
Louisiana

Supreme

contended

that

Presentence

Court

its

held

sentencing

Investigation

Report,

that

even

decision

though

v.
the

Casarez,5

the

trial

was unaffected

court

by

the

a defendant, who alleges false and

prejudicial statements were contained in his Report, was entitled to
the opportunity to refute or explain the same.

Id.

at 193-94.

The

failure of the trial court to allow such an opportunity was assigned
as error and reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent
with the court's opinion on that particular point.

Id.

at 194.

Similarly, in the instant case, the trial court, in effect,
refused to allow Defendant or Defendant's counsel the opportunity to
refute or explain the unsubstantiated assertions about Defendant in
the letters received by the trial court prior to sentencing.
Lockwood,

As in

a reversal and remand for resentencing is appropriate in

the instant case even if the trial court were to contend that it was
unaffected by the assertions set forth in the undisclosed letters.
Because of the trial court's complete failure to even disclose that
the letters were received, this Court is left to wonder as to the
trial court's rationale for such nondisclosure.

While this Court

might speculate that the trial court refused to disclose the content
or substance of the letters because it believed that disclosure might

s

See

State

v.

Casarez,

656 P.2d 1005, 1007-09 (Utah 1982).
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lead to harm of a third person, such a conclusion is totally without
support in the record.

See

Gomez,

887 P.2d at 855 (citing Utah Code

Ann. § 77-18-1(5) (Supp. 1994) and Casarez,

656 P.2d at 1008).

Even

if this were the case, the trial court arguably is required to make
such a finding and at least disclose the fact that the letters were
to be

considered

confidential.

See

Casarez,

656

P. 2d at

1008

(stating that "it is the exceptional case where full disclosure is
not

justified) .

Instead, the trial court here appears to have

subjectively determined that it would not disclose such information
to Defendant or Defendant's counsel.
In State

v.

Gomez,

887 P.2d 853 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme

Court held that the defendant's rights to due process and effective
assistance of counsel were not violated by the ex parte communication
between the trial court and a probation officer that prepared the
Presentence Investigation Report.

As a basis for its holding, the

Utah Supreme Court noted that the trial court provided the defendant
with a ufull opportunity . . .

to examine and challenge all factual

information upon which the court based his sentence."

Id.

at 855.

The court further recognized that after objection to the ex parte
communication,

the trial court

"fully disclosed

the purpose

and

substance of the communication and explained that no information
beyond

what

was

in

the

report
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was

provided

during

that

communication."

Id.

The defendant subsequently had the opportunity

to further inquire as to the information and to refute any inaccurate
or unreliable information that might have been provided to the trial
Id.

court, which the defendant failed to do.

The Utah Supreme

Court, however, under an effective assistance of counsel analysis,
stated,

u

If a sentencing judge is allowed to rely upon information

unknown to the defendant, the ability of counsel to effectively
challenge inaccurate information may be seriously impaired, thereby
threatening the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.
Id.

(citing Casarez,
Unlike

Gomez,

656 P.2d at 1007).
the trial court

in the instant

case did not

provide Defendant with any opportunity to examine or challenge the
information set forth in the undisclosed letters.

Moreover, the

trial court in the case at bar did not disclose that the letters
were even received.

By so doing, the trial court denied Defendant of

his right to effective assistance of counsel to assure compliance
with due process requirements.

Id.;

see

also

Casarez,

656 P.2d at

1007 (holding that uif a defendant cannot inspect the contents o the
presentence

report,

his

constitutional

right

to

the

effective

assistance of counsel at the time of sentencing is seriously impaired
if a judge may rely on information which may be inaccurate and is
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unknown to the defendant" (emphasis added)).
fact that Gomez and Casarez

One might point to the

involved presentence investigation

reports as some sort of a distinction between those cases and the
instant case.

However, the due process and effective assistance of

counsel principles set forth above apply equally if not more so to a
case such as this where the risk of unreliable information is greater
due to fact that such letters often come from individuals with whom
the trial court is unfamiliar and who often have some actual or
apparent bias with which the court may or may not be familiar.
Finally, public
letters

such

as

policy

those

in

concerns mandate
the

instant

case

full disclosure
inasmuch

as

w

of

[t]he

sentencing philosophy of the criminal law is that the punishment
should not only fit the crime but the defendant as well."
608 P. 2d at 1248.

Further,

u

Lipsky,

[i]t is essential that fairness in

sentencing both be perceived as such by the public and the defendant
and, in fact, be fair."

Id.

at 1249.

"The information about the

defendant must be accurate if society and the individual are to be
properly served."

2.

Id.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO A DETERMINATE SENTENCE OF FIVE
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YEARS PURSUANT TO THE FIREARMS ENHANCEMENT SET
FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.
An appellate court will set aside a sentence imposed by a trial
court if the sentence represents an abuse of discretion, the trial
court

failed

to consider all relevant

factors, or the

imposed exceeded the limits prescribed by law.
P.2d 851, 861 (Utah 1992) (citing State
1135 (Utah 1989).

v.

State

Gibbons,

sentence

v. Brown,

853

779 P.2d 1133,

However, when the trial court's interpretation and

application of a statute to a defendant's sentence is reviewed by the
appellate court for correction of error.
1355,

1357

(Utah 1993); State

v.

Vigil,

State

v.

Larsen,

865 P.2d

842 P.2d 843, 844

(Utah

1992) .
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3), which applies to the instant case
because of Defendant's conviction of a third degree felony by way of
guilty plea, provides:
A person who has been convicted of a felony may
be
sentenced
to
imprisonment
for
an
indeterminate
term as follows:

(3)
In the case of a felony of the
third degree, for a term not to exceed
five years but if the trier of fact
finds
a
dangerous
weapon
or
a
facsimile or the representation of a
dangerous weapon, as provided in
Section 76-1-601, was used in the
commission or furtherance of the
felony, the court may additionally
28

sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate
term not to exceed five
years to run consecutively and not
concurrently.
(Emphasis Added) .

Subsection

(1) of Utah

Code Ann.

§ 77-18-4

provides, "Whenever a person is convicted of a crime and the judgment
provides for a commitment to the state prison, the court shall not
fix a definite term of imprisonment unless otherwise provided by
law."

Further, subsection

(2) of

§ 77-18-4

states that

"[t]he

sentence and judgment of imprisonment shall be for an indeterminate
term of not less than the minimum and not to exceed the maximum term
provided by law for the particular crime."
While the issue of whether the trial court erred or abused its
discretion

in the course of

imposing

the

five year

enhancement

pursuant to the firearms enhancement statute is raised for the first
time on appeal,6 the principles of plain error, as set forth in the
aforementioned argument applies.

Here, the error of imposing on

Defendant a determinative sentence of five years under Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-203 should have been obvious to the trial court in light of
the plain language of the statute.

Furthermore, the error was

harmful in that the determinate sentence of five years communicates

6

See
State
v. Johnson,
774 P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Utah 1989)
("contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of
claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record before
an appellate court will review such a claim on appeal").
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to the Board of Pardons and Parole that not less than the five years
should be served for the enhancement, which arguably prevents the
Board

from exercising its discretion in terms of fashioning the

enhancement so as to give Defendant credit for any mitigating factors
or improvements due him while in the correctional system.

This

places on Defendant the undue burden of constantly overcoming the
determinate

five year enhancement, which according to the plain

language of the enhance statute should be indeterminate.
In the course of sentencing in the case at bar, the following
exchange between the trial court and defense counsel took place:
THE COURT:
. . . and because of those facts,
and
because
of
the
circumstances
where
somebody's lost their life, court [sic] is going
to enter the following sentence: To the charge
of aggravated assault, a felony of the third
degree, the Defendant is sentenced to the Utah
State Prison for an indeterminate term of zero
to five years.
Court is going to order the
firearm enhancement of five years to run
consecutively.
DEFENSE COUNSEL:

Full five years?

THE COURT: The full five years. . . .
(R. 193, lines 14-23, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing; see

also

R.

160, Sentence; and R. 169, Judgment).
In the course of imposing the determinate firearm enhancement
for a full five years, the trial court improperly interpreted the
firearm enhancement statute.

In the alternative, the trial court by
30

imposing the determinate term exceeded the limits prescribed by law
and thereby abused its discretion.

By so doing, the trial court

erred by fixing a definite term of imprisonment, thereby exceeding
its authority set forth in the enhancement and sentencing statutes.

3.

TRIAL COUNSEL, BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE IMPOSITION
OF A DETERMINATE FIVE YEAR TERM OF FIVE YEARS UNDER
THE FIREARM ENHANCEMENT STATUTE, DENIED DEFENDANT OF
HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL.

In Strickland

v.

Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984),

the United States Supreme Court established a two-prong test for
determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective
Id.

assistance of counsel has been denied.
1064.

at 687, 104 S.Ct. at

Utah courts adopted this test, which follows: u To prevail, a

defendant must show, first, that his counsel rendered a deficient
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below
an

objective

standard

of

reasonable

professional

judgment

second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant."
v.

Deland,

763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); accord

805 P.2d 182, 186

(Utah 1990); State v.

(Utah 1986); State v.
State v. Wright,

Perry,

Frame,

State

v.

and,
Bundy

Templin,

723 P.2d 401, 405

899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 1995)

893 P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah App. 1995).

u

[T]he right

to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own
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sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused
Lockhart

to receive a fair trial."

v.

Fretwell,

U.S.

,

,

113 S.Ct. 838, 842, (1993).
In order to meet the first prong of the test, a defendant must
ux

x

identify the acts or omissions' which, under the circumstances,

show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness.'" Templin,

Strickland,

805 P.2d at 186 (quoting

466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 2064 (footnotes omitted)).
A defendant must "overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel
rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional
judgment."
denied,

State v. Bullock,

791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert.

497 U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990).

To

show

prejudice

under

the

second

prong

of

the

test, a

defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceedings would have been different."
at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin,

Strickland,

466 U.S.

U

A reasonable

805 P.2d at 187.

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome."
Parsons
405.
court

v.

Barnes,

Strickland,

466

U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069;

871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah 1994); Frame,

723 P.2d at

In the process of arriving at this determination, the appellate
"should consider the totality of the evidence, taking into
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account

such

factors as whether

the errors affect

the entire

evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how strongly the
verdict is supported by the record."

Templin,

805 P.2d at 187.

In the instant case, trial counsel's failure to object to the
trial court imposing a determinative five year enhancement term under
the firearms enhancement statute set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3203 fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional
judgment in light of the plain language of the firearms enhancement
statute requiring an indeterminate term "not to exceed five years."
But for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the sentencing
proceedings would have been different inasmuch as it is reasonably
probable that the trial court, upon objection from trial counsel,
would have corrected the enhancement to that of a indeterminate term.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that this
Court vacate his sentence and remand the case for resentencing in
light of the contents set forth in the undisclosed letters submitted
to the trial court after entry of Defendant's guilty plea but prior
to sentencing so that Defendant might be receive, among other things,
his constitutional right to due process and for the trial court to
resentence Defendant on a nunc pro tunc basis.
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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant
issues in the instant appeal dealing with the constitutional right to
due process, which are matters of continuing public interest and
which involve issues requiring further development in the area of
criminal

law case development.

Counsel

for Defendant

further

requests that the method of disposition of the instant appeal be by
opinion designated by the Court

"For Official Publication" for

purposes of precedential value in future cases.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J$f(\ day of July, 1996.
lOLftaREN, ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L.C.

SbetX^l, Wigc
Attorneys for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
NONE
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